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“Rocinha is ours”. So read the headline of O Globo, Rio de Janeiro’s leading newspaper, on 14 
November 2011 (Sintracoop, 2011). This was the day after the city’s largest favela had been 
‘pacified’ by special police and the armed forces. According to the report, over the space of 
two hours the state “retook” the favela and would now “re-establish services for its 100 
thousand residents” (Ibid.). A few months later, a new Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (Police 
Pacification Unit, UPP) would be installed to retain a permanent police presence in the area. 
*Manuscript without author identifiers (ensure filename does not include author name)




The meaning of O Globo’s words was unmistakable. For years, Rocinha had been dominated 
by one or other of Rio’s major drug trafficking factions, who had used the favela’s vast, 
warren-like territory as a logistical base and marketplace for large-scale drug trafficking 
(Glenny, 2015). They had also exercised a powerful influence over social and political life in 
the favela and, in the view of the authorities as well as much of Rio’s population, constituted 
major source of insecurity across the wider city. “Rocinha is ours” meant the state had finally 
taken control of this “parallel” territory. 
Only a few years later, Globo’s headline rings hollow. In February 2018, federal troops were 
sent to Rio to contain what embattled President Michel Temer framed as a profound security 
crisis. Two months later, it was announced that the number of UPPs in the city would be 
halved from 38 to 19 through a combination of closures and mergers, allowing the security 
ministry to reduce costs and more flexibly redeploy police to other areas (Exame, 2018).1 
Against a backdrop of severe austerity and a general rise in crime across the city, the sense of 
crisis was intensified by the spectacle of open conflict erupting in numerous pacified favelas. 
Indeed, in late 2017 large gun battles had broken out between rival groups in Rocinha itself, 
with police struggling to reimpose order. The UPPs’ apparent inability to keep favelas 
“pacified” begs the question of what had gone wrong. Had the authorities gained power in 
these favelas and then lost it again? Or had they never really  “pacified” them at all?  
As much of the literature on security, policing and crime in Latin America has identified, 
agents of the state need not only be physically “present” in particular spaces to enforce the 
law, but must also be effective at responding to the demands of their populations within the 
bounds of institutional and legal protocol (Arias and Goldstein, 2010; Garmany, 2014). Such 
conditions clearly do not prevail in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas (Machado da Silva, 2010; Arias and 
Barnes, 2017; Penglase, 2009). However, even where police do not provide effective public 
security, traffickers cannot be said to oversee a “separate” order. Police and other state 
agents contribute in crucial ways to the way governance in favelas occurs by helping to shape 
                                                      
1 Both Rocinha and Tuiuti (the case I will present below) retained their UPPs in this 
reorganisation. However, the victories of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil’s recent presidential election 
and of Wilson Witzel in Rio de Janeiro’s gubernatorial election (yet to assume office at time 
of writing), both on far-right law-and-order platforms, seem to foreshadow a dramatic shift 
away from the pacification approach and the likelihood of a significant increase in police 




the opportunity structures in which criminal actors operate via the ways in which they 
repress, tolerate and/or collude with illegal activities, and the extent of their (in)ability and 
(un)willingness to guarantee the rights of residents (Misse, 2007; Arias, 2006; Garmany, 2014; 
Feltran, 2010). The question surrounding police interventions like pacification is not whether 
the state “arrives” or not, but in what ways – and with what consequences – they alter the 
constellation of forces that together produce local (in)security. 
Presenting fieldwork conducted in Tuiuti – a favela located in Rio de Janeiro’s North Zone –, 
and drawing on ‘assemblage thinking’ (Richmond, 2018), I argue that rather than representing 
the arrival of a new state-led security regime, the UPPs overlaid and fused with the pre-
existing regime dominated by traffickers. In this way, they constituted what I describe as a  
‘dual security assemblage’, where both sides came to co-produce security through complex 
arrangements of implicit co-operation, accompanied by constant mutual surveillance. In the 
case of Tuiuti, the consequence for favela residents was not necessarily enhanced social 
control at the hands of police, but rather greater uncertainty. As the new terms of police–
trafficker coexistence became routinised, residents were forced to navigate a local security 
environment in which both the de facto rules they were expected to observe, and whom had 
responsibility for enforcing them, had become hopelessly blurred. 
The way in which I mobilise ‘assemblage’ builds upon previous use of the concept in 
geography (eg. McFarlane, 2011; Baker and McGuirk, 2011; Richmond, 2018) by using it to 
identify complex scalar relations and the unpredictable ways in which these shift over time 
and mesh together in space. However, I also go on to think explicitly about the power 
dynamics that help to produce and delimit particular urban security assemblages. This reveals 
assemblage approaches to be far from the caricature of a depoliticised and merely descriptive 
‘naïve objectivism’ (Brenner et al., 2011; Storper and Scott, 2016) and instead as a valuable 
tool for identifying how broad asymmetries of power persist through and constrain the 
emergence of local security conditions without directly determining them. As I shall describe, 
the UPP programme was designed in ways that revealed highly skewed power relations and 
was imposed on favelas in a top-down fashion. However, in the case of Tuiuti, the interaction 
of specific features of the programme with embedded local relationships meant pacification 




accommodation developed within the a broader logic that continued to systematically deny 
favela residents access to meaningful public security.  
Urban security regimes in Latin America: Towards an assemblage approach 
Security in Latin America’s marginalised urban spaces 
Rio de Janeiro has long been seen as an emblematic, if in some ways eccentric, case of the 
endemic gang and police violence that has plagued many Latin American cities over recent 
decades. Although violence has been an ever-present feature of social regulation in the city, 
new explosive forms of conflict emerged in the 1980s as armed drug trafficking groups 
emerged and entrenched themselves in the city’s numerous favelas (Richmond, 2018; Arias 
and Barnes, 2018). By the 1990s, internecine splits had given rise to fierce inter-factional 
rivalries and a system of market competition through the violent contestation of favela 
territory. Police, meanwhile, adopted counter-insurgency tactics, making periodic and often 
violent incursions into favelas in pursuit of particular targets before leaving again. In addition 
to the threat of stray bullets, favela residents effectively see their rights suspended during 
such operations. Use of arbitrary stop-and-search and house raids are common, and 
prosecutions resulting from deaths at the hand of police extremely rare. These dynamics are 
partly reinforced by public opinion, which became increasingly tolerant of indiscriminate and 
extra-legal methods of policing favelas as the latter were scapegoated as the main source of 
insecurity in the city (Machado da Silva, 2010). However, the human cost and spill-over effects 
also generate political pressure to seek more effective and less bloody policing responses 
(McCann, 2014). 
By 2008, such concerns had led to the creation of the UPP programme. This strategy 
prioritised reducing the violence and visibility of drug trafficking, rather than repression of 
the drug trade itself, via the implantation of permanent, specially-trained pacification units in 
favelas. Originally, the UPPs were presented as part of a broader agenda of social integration 
of favelas through a range of urban and social interventions, although most of these were 
gradually watered down or abandoned (Richmond and Garmany, 2016; Richmond, 2015). In 
any case, the rhetoric of integration always sat uncomfortably with a favela-specific policing 
model that created distinct security protocols and hierarchies in these territories (Fleury, 




powers within the areas they controlled, with discretion for adopting tactics like curfews and 
stop-and-search (Fleury, 2012). Variations in approaches adopted, as well as in security 
conditions and historical relations between police, traffickers and residents, appear to 
underpin differences in the results and reception of the programme in different favelas 
(Vilarouca and Ribeiro, 2016).  
The more repressive features of the UPP programme and the highly uneven geography of 
where units were established – concentrated in favelas located near to wealthy areas and key 
urban infrastructure – led many to view it as a ‘neoliberal’ policing strategy, designed to 
protect new urban circuits of capital accumulation via the repression of marginalised groups 
(eg. Saborio 2013; Freeman, 2014). Taking a longer view, others have situated “pacification” 
as a recurring nation-building strategy in Brazil since the colonial era, that aims to incorporate 
subaltern social and racial groups through the combined use of violence and ‘tutelage’ 
(Pacheco de Oliveira, 2014; Pereira Leite, 2014). However, while economic and “civilising” 
logics were clearly both present in the design of the UPP programme, such analyses are of 
limited use for the question addressed here – of how pacification has actually played out on 
the ground. That is to say, just because the UPPs sought to dominate favela territory does not 
mean they were necessarily successful in doing so.  
Some ethnographic accounts of pacification have highlighted tensions and contradictions in 
the implementation of pacification and resident perceptions of the programme. For example, 
Menezes (2014) interprets the rumours circulating among favela residents in different phases 
following pacification as an attempt to understand the shifting relational dynamics between 
police and traffickers. Rather than the unambiguous imposition of a new state-led order, 
residents experienced uncertainty, having no established precedent for knowing what 
pacification would mean in practice. Larkins (2013), meanwhile, highlights the way in which 
‘spectacular’ forms of policing favelas, designed for televised consumption by the middle 
classes, bears little relation to residents’ experiences. In this way it paradoxically reinforces 
trafficker influence in favelas by showing up the farcical nature of the state’s claims to 
sovereignty. 
The emphasis in these accounts on complex relationships between the state, traffickers and 




governance in Latin America. In Rio de Janeiro itself, scholars such as Misse (2007) and Arias 
(2006) have described illegal markets as being regulated by networks that contain criminal 
actors, state agents and economic elites who use money and influence as well as violence in 
managing their relationships. Depending on the actors, markets and spaces in question, this 
may produce diverse types of ‘plural order’ in cities, seen for example in the contrasts 
between trafficker- and militia-dominated favelas (Arias and Barnes, 2017). In cities such as 
São Paulo (Feltran, 2010; 2012; Denyer Willis, 2015), Medellín (Abello-Colak and Guarneros-
Meza, 2014), Mexico City (Becker and Müller, 2013) and Kingston (Jaffe, 2013), hybrid 
formations characterised by fluctuating dynamics of conflict and negotiation have been 
identified in which armed criminal groups take advantage of both gaps left and institutions 
created by the state to strengthen their own local influence. Notwithstanding great diversity 
across cases, these dynamics and tensions appear to characterise policing in marginalised 
urban spaces across much of Latin America and the Caribbean (Arias and Goldstein, 2010).  
Assemblage thinking and socio-spatial (trans)formations 
In light of such negotiated, multi-polar relations between state and non-state actors, I 
propose that ‘assemblage thinking’2 offers some useful tools for conceptualising these 
arrangements’ relational, scalar, temporal and causal dynamics. With its origins in the 
philosophical writings of Deleuze and Guattari, ‘assemblage’ refers most basically to the “the 
‘holding together’ of heterogeneous elements” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 323) in partially 
stabilised formations (see Nail, 2017; Richmond, 2018). The concept has become particularly 
popular among geographers and urbanists in recent years due to its apparent ability to 
incorporate diverse actors – both human and non-human – and the complex interactions 
between them, into contextually sensitive accounts of socio-spatial (trans)formations (eg. 
Anderson et al. 2012; McFarlane 2011; Baker and McGuirk, 2017). However, there is 
considerable disagreement, not to mention much confusion, about whether and how the 
concept might be usefully applied to social and geographical analysis (McFarlane, 2011; 
Brenner et al., 2011; Storper and Scott, 2016; Buchanan, 2015; 2017). 
                                                      
2 I use the term ‘assemblage thinking’ rather than ‘assemblage theory’ to acknowledge that 
while use of the term is diverse and not reducible to a single uniform theory, it does signal a 




As many have noted, assemblage itself is a problematic translation of the original French 
agencement (Nail, 2017; Buchanan, 2017). While the former suggests an emergence of order 
among different entities, the latter implies the active arrangement of pieces by an external 
agent. However, Deleuze and Guattari also used the term in different ways, for example in 
their references to biology (which are closer to the English assemblage and have had greater 
influence over geographers) and in their writings on psychoanalysis (see below). These 
ambiguities seem central to current disagreements. Geographers’ use of assemblage has 
tended to emphasise features such as the irreducibility of context, the contingency of 
relations, and ‘distributed agency’ between the social and the material (eg. Farías and Bender, 
2010; McFarlane, 2011). This has attracted criticism from those who argue that such an 
approach is incapable of distinguishing between “necessary” and “contingent” elements of 
assemblages, and ends up becoming a form of “naïve objectivism” (Brenner et al., 2011; 
Storper and Scott, 2016). In this way, they argue, mapping assemblages becomes a purely 
descriptive exercise, denuded of any capacity to identify broader structuring logics and, 
therefore, of shedding light on how power inequalities are (re)produced.  
Such criticisms are partly related to questions of temporality. Use of assemblage in geography 
has tended to invoke a particular temporal imaginary that emphasises flux, contingency and 
becoming in contrast to one of static structures that reproduce socio-spatial inequalities in 
relatively predictable ways. It can thus appear to defend a kind of ‘presentism’ – “a reification 
of the present moment in practice in intellectual, political and ethical terms, and a view of the 
present moment as a pure event” (Jones and Garde-Hansen, 2012: 7). However, as has been 
argued elsewhere, assemblage is equally suited to identifying the persistence of social and 
spatial arrangements and the inequalities and injustices they generate (Richmond, 2018; 
Saldanha, 2006). Key here are the twin concepts of de- and reterritorialisation (Nail, 2017: 33-
36). Where the relations that surround a given assemblage change or are weakened, the 
assemblage may display deterritorialising tendencies. However, in most cases these will be 
counteracted by a process of reterritorialisation, which sustains the assemblage, adjusting it 
to and/or assimilating new elements and relations. Reterritorialisation, in this way, calls to 
mind Lampedusa’s (2007) famous dictum that “If we want things to stay as they are, things 
will have to change”. In fact, only in the rare event of ‘absolute deterritorialisation’ are 




by unequal power relations, as stronger reterritorialising processes tend to overpower 
weaker deterritorialising ones. 
If assemblage thinking is in fact capable of encompassing varying temporal dynamics, it is also 
clearly well suited to developing sensitive accounts of spatial relationships (Bonta and Protevi, 
2004). Some of Deleuze and Guattari’s most evocative writings refer to the generative 
interactions of diverse entities in particular environments. The wasp and the orchid, for 
example, are entirely distinct species but their encounter in space allowed them to evolve 
together and incorporate one another into their respective reproductive routines (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 10). The “refrain”, or repetition, of such routines gives consistency to such 
relationships, assigning functions to different actors and delineating the spaces in which they 
may occur (Ibid.: 323). As the word implies, then, as well as determining duration, 
territorialisation occupies space, mutually imbricating social and spatial arrangements. 
In his influential writings on assemblage, DeLanda (2006; 2016) describes such ecological 
assemblages as characterised by ‘relations of exteriority’3 – although the ‘heterogeneous 
elements’, like the wasp and the orchid, are integrated into the assemblage, they remain 
distinct entities and, at least in theory, capable of acting independently of it. DeLanda 
contrasts this with a vision of ‘relations of interiority’ whereby a part is understood to exist 
exclusively as a function of the whole (DeLanda, 2006: 19). There is an implicit scalar logic 
here, whereby assemblages emerge out of the interaction of parts in a primarily bottom-up 
fashion, as opposed to ‘macro-reductionist’ models (Ibid.) where parts are assumed to be by-
products of fully integrated “totalities”. This insight is particularly helpful for challenging 
fallacies of composition and hasty generalisations that would attribute the same “underlying” 
cause or structure to empirical phenomena that exhibit some superficial resemblance. On the 
other hand, it is not necessarily clear what organises a bottom-up assemblage, where 
component parts appear to have no motive force beyond a kind of crude vitality, and no logic 
to their interactions apart from an elusive force of “self-organisation”. This may not be a 
problem if more systematic logics can be identified in assemblages on a case-by-case basis. 
However, the risk, as highlighted by Brenner et al. (2011), is of failing to identify broader logics 
                                                      
3 DeLanda’s version of assemblage theory draws on evolutionary and complexity theory and, 





– of capital(ism), structured gender or racial inequalities, exclusionary regimes of citizenship 
and so one – that inevitably traverse different local assemblages and are likely to be 
implicated in their reterritorialisations. 
For not dissimilar reasons, though within a Deleuzoguattarian framework, Buchanan (2015; 
2017) rejects such an approach and calls for assemblage thinking to return to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s writings on psychoanalysis (eg. Deleuze and Guattari, 1983; 1987: 26-39). Citing a 
key conceptual precursor of assemblage, the ‘desiring machine’, Buchanan argues that 
assemblages are not the product of complex, contingent interactions. Rather, they are 
collections of associations drawn together by an individual subject to alleviate a particular 
condition (Buchanan, 2015). The specifics of an assemblage are thus of analytical interest to 
the extent that they offer insights into the ‘machine’ that produced them. As Deleuze and 
Guattari (1983: 3) ask: “Given a certain effect, what machine is capable of producing it? And 
given a certain machine, what can it be used for?” Buchanan’s emphasis on the generative 
forces surrounding the (trans)formation of assemblages is not a turn to ‘totality’, however. 
The machine applies a “principle of inclusion and exclusion”, but does not determine the 
outcome, and is characterised by shifting and uncertain relations between internal and 
external elements, and between material content and semiotic expression. “Something 
always escapes” (Buchanan, 2017: 471). 
Based on these arguments, Buchanan (2017: 468-73)4 presents a brief but intriguing example 
of how assemblage thinking can be applied to questions of policy development and socio-
spatial (trans)formations. A house-building programme for indigenous Australians living in a 
remote region ran over budget, leading to discontent among predominantly white, tax-paying 
city dwellers that was clearly underpinned by deep social inequalities and racist attitudes. This 
led to desperate efforts to reduce costs which played out through negotiations between 
various actors involved in the assemblage – government, the contracted housebuilder, white 
voters, indigenous programme beneficiaries – each of whom possessed different degrees of 
power for pursuing their desired outcomes. What ultimately resulted was the construction of 
substandard housing that was nonetheless presented to the public as a successful rescue of 
the programme. As Buchanan explains, the transformation of this programme occurred 
                                                      




within limiting conditions imposed by language, materiality, history, economic resources and 
so on. While there are limits to what can be defined as a “home”, this may be stretched within 
what historically imposed limits will allow, for example, the kinds of homes that society would 
tolerate indigenous Australians living in, the financial resources made available and so on.  
That is to say that real actors negotiate how policies and spaces may be transformed, often 
with highly unpredictable results. However, these tend to reterritorialise within certain limits, 
weighed down by social inequalities and subject to processes and relationships that transcend 
local sites of assemblage. In what follows, I shall analyse how pacification materialised in 
Tuiuti favela through complex, locally developed arrangements between police, traffickers 
and residents, though in ways that ultimately remained within broader logics of inequality 
and insecurity in the city. 
Tuiuti favela: Before and after pacification 
Tuiuti is a favela with a population of approximately 5,700 residents, located within the 
neighbourhood of São Cristóvão in Rio de Janeiro’s North Zone (IBGE, 2010). Physically, it is 
typical of Rio’s older hillside favelas having an irregular form that betrays an incremental and 
informal process of construction, densification and verticalisation over several decades (see 
Figure 1). Despite this, compared to other such favelas, Tuiuti is relatively open, with a road 
accessible to cars running along the main ridge of the hill. The built environment is also highly 
consolidated, having benefitted from the Favela Bairro (‘Favela Neighbourhood’) upgrading 
programme in the 1990s, which brought paved streets, stairways, street-lighting, and 
recreational spaces to the area. The favela also contains some public services although these 
struggle to meet high levels of demand in the area (Richmond, 2015). 
<FIGURE 1> 
Figure 1. Tuiuti has a dense and irregular built form typical of Rio’s older hillside favelas, but 
is also highly consolidated with multi-floor homes and paved streets and stairways 
The analysis that follows is based on eight months of fieldwork carried out in Tuiuti in 2013, 
beginning just over a year after it had been pacified at the end of 2011. The research included 
semi-structured interviews with thirty residents who varied in terms of age, gender, race, and 




the residents association and two local NGOs. While I did not carry out interviews directly 
with police or traffickers, I was aware of their presence and attentive to their spatial practices. 
Nonetheless, the analysis that follows should not be interpreted as a direct account of these 
actors’ respective strategies and internal deliberations. Rather it is based on my respondents’ 
and my own interpretations of how pacification had materialised in the neighbourhood. As 
such, my approach accords with that taken by Menezes (2014), who conceives of rumours 
circulating between residents as an attempt to ontologically stabilise and make knowable a 
highly uncertain situation. 
Tuiuti before pacification 
According to the accounts of older residents, Tuiuti was drawn into Rio de Janeiro’s dynamic 
of gang and police violence at an early stage. Following a period of intense violent conflict 
between two local street gangs in 1979, Tuiuti and its emerging cocaine trade soon fell under 
the control of the Comando Vermelho (CV) faction, who have dominated the favela ever since. 
Over this time, drug trafficking in Tuiuti has remained relatively stable, certainly compared to 
other favelas which have seen more explosive patterns of conflict between rival gangs and 
police. As one respondent remarked, after the CV took over: 
There were no more problems. No-one killed any more. Whoever died was 
involved... If you died from a bullet there, it was an isolated incident. It’s not 
like that kind of thing where it’s every day stray bullets. [Male, 45] 
From time to time the peace has been broken during internal disputes, typically on the few 
occasions when a local ‘dono’ (drug boss) was killed or imprisoned and his subordinates 
struggled to succeed him. There have also been periodic gun battles with police. According to 
residents, these often occurred when police operations spilled over from the larger 
neighbouring favela of Mangueira, also controlled by the CV, which was the target of more 
frequent and intense police interventions. 
Several factors help to explain why drug trafficker dominance of Tuiuti prior to pacification 
had not been accompanied by the same levels of violence found elsewhere. One was that the 
long-standing dono had a policy of avoiding confrontation with the police and so had kept 




relatively open layout of Tuiuti may have made it unsuitable as a defensible base, while its 
relative distance from key transport supply routes also reduced its value as a site for large-
scale drug distribution. Because of this, Tuiuti remained in effect a junior partner to 
Mangueira as a centre of CV operations in the region. Finally, the two other smaller favelas in 
the surrounding region are also CV-controlled, while the nearest favela to be controlled by a 
rival faction is sufficiently distant to make have made inter-factional conflict historically rare.  
A further, crucial aspect of the relative stability of the pre-pacification trafficker regime in 
Tuiuti relates to trafficker–resident relations. In broad terms, the way in which the CV 
embedded itself within and also reshaped patterns of sociability in Tuiuti fits with experiences 
across Rio de Janeiro’s trafficker-controlled favelas. Given its longevity and weakly marketised 
housing sector,5 Tuiuti’s population is both highly stable and densely networked. This helped 
traffickers to embed their presence in community life, but also served to constrain them in 
important ways. Although a negligible proportion of residents has any meaningful 
involvement in the drugs trade, gang members are known to all residents and are likely to 
have large numbers of relatives in the neighbourhood. This obliges traffickers to maintain 
outward displays of respect for residents, or at least those who are deemed worthy of such 
status (see Arias and Rodrigues, 2006). One resident described how such relationships shaped 
local sociability prior to pacification: 
Those of us who have lived here a long time end up knowing even the people 
who are involved in those things. And so, despite their involvement, as 
we’ve known them a long time, we have that “security”, in quotation marks, 
that they will respect us, because they know us. That’s really what happens. 
If it was a person coming from outside alone, before I would have had a 
certain fear to say “yeah go up there”. Because, it’s like this, a person from 
outside, they might think “What’s this guy doing? Why’s he looking?” 
[Female, 38] 
                                                      
5 In a study of housing market dynamics in twelve favelas, Abramo (2003) found that Tuiuti 
had the lowest proportion of residents who had bought or were renting their current 




These dense network ties stretching across the divide between drug traffickers and ordinary 
residents might be assumed to blur this distinction. However, they seemed to have had the 
counter-intuitive effect of reinforcing it. Instead of drawing residents into the business of drug 
trafficking, it apparently promoted a consensus among traffickers to respect the neutrality of 
those not involved in the drug trade. One resident explained: 
Here the little guys [“carinhas”] just wanted to sell drugs [...]. It was never 
to mess with the community, with people, residents. [...] When the traffic 
was worse here... There are always some who are more cunning, you know? 
The ones who work for someone but think they’ll knock him off, and then 
he finds out. And God they tried it and the guy knocked them off. But it was 
just with them and not with the family, just with the people who were 
actually working in it. The family itself, he never went to get the family like 
you hear in other places, to kill the family, or expel them, you understand. 
[Female, 46] 
In more concrete ways, the CV regime in Tuiuti pre-pacification offered the kinds of “services” 
widely associated with trafficker dominance of favelas (see Penglase 2009). Forms of 
criminality not associated with drug trafficking itself – domestic abuse, rape, theft, robbery 
etc. – were explicitly forbidden and violently punished. Mediation was offered to resolve day-
to-day disputes and traffickers made some ad hoc investments in community amenities. In 
exchange for these benefits, residents were expected to observe the traffickers’ rules and 
remain quiet about their illegal activities. The density of networks spanning the trafficker–
resident divide may be conceived as having promoted a peculiar form of ‘collective efficacy’ 
in Tuiuti (Sampson, 2012; Arias and Barnes, 2018). That is to say, the thick web of overlapping 
relationships and obligations to some extent checked the indiscriminate use of violence by 
the local CV command and generated pressures on them to assist the community in concrete, 
if limited, ways. 
This scenario should not be romanticised. Trafficker interventions were made on an 
inconsistent basis and rested on resident hierarchies and personal channels of access to 
senior traffickers (Penglase 2009). Relations with the community were ultimately determined 




flaunted weaponry in public spaces and requisitioned buildings in the community for their 
own use. Their violence was uncompromising when their own interests were challenged. One 
highly respected local resident described how her family had been unable to prevent the 
“execution” of her brother who had become addicted to drugs and accumulated debts. 
Meanwhile, in spite of his own circumspection, the dono’s obligations to the CV hierarchy 
meant that Tuiuti’s residents suffered when he was obliged to provide support to traffickers 
from neighbouring Mangueira, provoking police incursions. Clearly, any civilising effect 
community cohesion might have had on trafficker behaviour towards residents could be 
quickly overridden by the imperatives of maintaining power and the flow of illicit profits.  
In sum, prior to pacification we can identify a relatively stable set of routines, practices and 
expectations between traffickers and residents in Tuiuti that preserved a minimal degree of 
predictability. Nonetheless, traffickers remained broadly unaccountable to and sometimes 
violent towards residents. They also depended upon and contributed to residents’ lack of 
access to public security. At the same time, such security arrangements did not give 
politicians, police or the wider non-favela-residing public the sense of control they desired 
over spaces like Tuiuti, generating political demands at the state-level that would ultimately 
give rise to the UPP programme.  
The post-pacification scenario 
Under the exogenous influence of pacification, security arrangements in Tuiuti were radically 
transformed beginning in late 2011. Following months of preparatory police operations – 
including one that led to a gun battle along the main entry road into Tuiuti – and advanced 
warning in the media, heavily armed police entered Tuiuti and neighbouring Mangueira on 3 
November. They were met with no resistance. Tuiuti’s dono had fled the area a few days 
earlier, and the lower-ranking CV “soldiers” who remained ceased to carry arms or sell drugs 
in the open. Subsequently, a small UPP base was installed in the most visible and symbolically 
potent location possible – next to the resident’s association in Tuiuti’s central square (Figure 






Figure 2. The UPP base, located in Tuiuti’s central square 
Other changes also soon became apparent. Despite having just one physical base in the area, 
UPP officers began to carry out foot and car patrols around Tuiuti. A few respondents 
mentioned seeing or hearing of incidents of young people being searched and harassed by 
police without good reason, and of officers being abusive to residents. Although, as 
mandated, UPP representatives would formally meet with the residents’ association, local 
NGOs and service providers once a month to address community concerns, it soon became 
clear that the local commander could act with untrammeled authority if he wished to. One 
incident in particular revealed the extent of the UPP’s power. A group of residents arranged 
a party in a playground where such events were commonly held, but failed to register the 
event with the UPP in advance. When the party began, police informed residents that as they 
had not requested prior permission it could not go ahead. When guests refused to leave, 
police dispersed the crowd using tear gas. Such stories of conflict arising from a mismatch 
between formal police protocol and long-standing informal practices among residents were 
widely reported across pacified favelas (World Bank, 2012: 69-73).  
Such accounts would fit with a view of pacification as an aggressive new regime of social 
control designed to repress the favela population – one in which the programme’s 
“neoliberal” character might be sufficient to account for the concrete form it took. However, 
other aspects of the post-pacification scenario sit uncomfortably with such an interpretation. 
It was an open secret that traffickers continued to operate in the community, with drugs and 
guns still circulating, albeit less visibly. The previous dono had been replaced by an internally 
promoted successor, whom, according to one respondent, everyone including the police 
knew about. They also clearly continued to exert powerful influence over residents, local 
businesses and institutions. This influence was laid bare in February 2013, when a UPP officer 
was robbed at gunpoint and two murders were committed in Tuiuti on the same night 
(Werneck and Ramalho 2013).6 The following day, businesses in Tuiuti and Mangueira kept 
their doors shut at the behest of the traffickers – a display of enforced deference that was 
commonplace prior to pacification. In another example, in 2014, evidence emerged that 
                                                      
6 Conflicting rumours circulated about the crime, of it either being an internal conflict within 




candidates for Rio’s municipal council elections were prevented from campaigning in Tuiuti 
in order to guarantee the victory of the traffickers’ preferred candidate (Soares, 2016). Clearly 
pacification had not significantly disrupted either drug trafficking networks or traffickers’ 
influence over social and political life in Tuiuti. 
All of this could simply mean that despite their best efforts the police were simply unable to 
flush out the traffickers. However, this view also appears difficult to sustain. My experience 
walking around Tuiuti was that the UPP’s “control” of the territory was fairly limited. I rarely 
saw police circulating far from the base and they seemed reluctant to pursue minor forms of 
illegality. Indeed, some respondents complained that policing in Tuiuti was too light-touch to 
be effective, and that the UPP turned a blind eye to much that went on. On more than one 
occasion, I saw groups of young men smoking marijuana close to the UPP base. One 
respondent said that when she complained to an officer about marijuana being smoked by 
her home she was told that it was the UPP’s objective to catch “those who sold drugs, not 
those who used them”. Another remarked that she believed the traffickers were “having a 
party” with the UPP, as they knew nothing would be done to interfere with their activities. 
Clearly, Tuiuti’s post-pacification security scenario cannot simply be characterised as a 
repressive state-led regime with the UPP replacing traffickers as the dominant force. 
A new refrain: Pacification as dual security assemblage 
There are many possible ways to account for the contradictory evidence and diversity of 
resident attitudes regarding pacification in Tuiuti. One factor is that the UPP would likely have 
affected different parts of the population in different ways according to factors like age, 
gender, race and social conditions (World Bank, 2012). Young, dark-skinned men would be 
more likely to have had negative interactions with police and thus to see the UPP as an 
aggressive force of occupation. By contrast, elderly people and those with young children 
might feel less threatened by police and see their presence as enhancing security. Other 
important factors may include the individual’s attitudes towards the pre-pacification 
trafficker-led regime, and the physical proximity of their home and daily routine to the UPP 
base, where police presence would be most strongly felt.  
There is also the question of temporality – of how new forms of coexistence between police 




reflected a specific moment in the gradual routinisation of the UPP and mutual familiarisation 
between residents and police (Menezes 2014) – of a “refrain” territorialising a new 
assemblage (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 310-351). One respondent expressed such a view: 
Respondent [Female, 36]: It’s improved, it’s improved a lot, you know. It’s 
like this, when the UPP entered there were some problems, some 
confusion. Because people didn’t want to accept them, to get used to them, 
and it was complicated… 
Interviewer: Confusion like what? 
Respondent: Ah, it’s that they prohibited people from doing lots of things. 
Interviewer: Like the parties? 
Respondent: Yes that’s it. “Ah there’s a party in your house, the noise is too 
loud, you have to turn it off”, you understand? So it was like they arrived 
like that without knowing the rhythm of the community. [But] now it’s good. 
However, while we might be able to identify differential impacts across time, space and a 
diverse resident population, the interviews and fieldwork also allowed for the identification 
of certain consistencies in the picture that emerged from the routinisation of the UPP, and 
the parameters it established for both police and trafficker action. In the remainder of this 
article I argue that what emerged can helpfully be understood as a ‘dual security assemblage’. 
This assemblage emerged from the efforts of both the UPP and the traffickers achieve their 
objectives while adapting to the unavoidable presence of the other. 
The mutual accommodation of police and traffickers within this assemblage is largely forced 
upon them by the constraints both face. On one side, it is clear that Tuiuti’s traffickers would 
be unable to resist the UPP directly. On the other, despite their superior force, the police are 
unable to mobilise the resources or use the kinds of tactics that would be needed to have any 
chance of ejecting the traffickers from the territory. However, the stalemate is also made 
possible by the two sides’ respective strategic priorities. If traffickers are still able to profit 
from the drugs trade even in the presence of the UPP, past practices of visibly territorialising 
favela territory and engaging in open conflict with police may not be necessary. Similarly, if 




trade, rather than eliminating it altogether, repressive action against suspected drug 
traffickers can be used sparingly. In fact, given the reputational risks to the programme of 
high profile conflicts or human rights abuses, light-touch policing may be the most rational 
approach for commanders to take. Taking into account this partial compatibility of the 
respective objectives of the UPP and traffickers in Tuiuti, pacification ceases to look like 
straightforward state repression, and more like a new set of parameters within which 
localised modes of coexistence could develop. 
Becoming–police, becoming–bandidos 
This argument suggests that police and traffickers in Tuiuti tolerate one another reluctantly. 
However, respondents’ accounts suggest that they were in fact able to benefit in more 
positive ways from one other’s presence. A recurring complaint among residents, mentioned 
previously, is that petty forms of criminal activity unconnected to drug trafficking and almost 
unheard of prior to pacification had become increasingly common. Marize, 53, a lifelong 
resident who had raised her adult son in Tuiuti and had a large extended family in the area, 
described how she viewed the changes in security conditions: 
Before, I was really in favour of the UPP coming here. God, for me it was a 
dream for them to come here. […] I was in favour of them coming because 
I thought that lots of things were going to change. Even though it wasn’t 
violent before, I thought it was going to improve. But I think it got worse. 
With the entry of the UPP the dono here left. He left and we ended up 
without law, you understand. So those other bandidinhos7 started to cause 
lots of trouble. They started to rob. They started to smoke marijuana close 
to us. Sometimes the smell enters my house, you understand, and you can’t 
complain. 
She explained that a convicted criminal who was out on parole living back in Tuiuti was 
rumoured to have burgled the homes of several residents. However, although a group had 
gone to the UPP to complain they had been told that the police couldn’t do anything due to 
                                                      
7 “Bandido”, literally “bandit”, is the term widely used to refer to drug traffickers and other 




a lack of evidence. In light of this, she believed that overall pacification had reduced, rather 
than enhancing, the state of security in the area: 
Today I’m… [here], my son is working, my husband is working, I won’t leave 
the window open any more […] because I’m scared. When it was the 
bandidos I left it open, because people are more scared of the bandidos than 
of the police here, you know. After the UPP arrived it became a mess, you 
understand. 
While Marize saw this as the result of police weakness and incompetence, there is a 
straightforward explanation for why the police are less adept at dealing with such incidents. 
To detain a suspect the police require a minimal level of evidence of probable guilt. “Knowing” 
someone is guilty based on their character, track record and because rumours have circulated 
about their alleged activities is not sufficient. By contrast, trafficker justice, embedded as it is 
in local relationships and hierarchies of legitimacy (Arias and Rodrigues 2006; Penglase 2009), 
faces no such impediments or delays. Indeed, as Marize rightly observes, the fact that the ex-
convict she described would be presumed guilty and punished efficiently under trafficker rule 
would probably act as a far greater deterrent than the unlikely prospect of him being 
investigated and charged by police. 
Police are certainly aware of this security gap between the kind of order traffickers had been 
capable of imposing prior to pacification and of their own inability to do so. In this regard, and 
although it may seem paradoxical, the traffickers could in fact be of use to the UPP. Traffickers 
were no longer able to openly mete out summary justice with impunity as they had before, 
and appeared to be relying on softer means of retaining influence. One respondent explained 
that the presence of a former senior trafficker who had served a prison sentence and 
supposedly was no longer involved continued to act as a deterrent to potential petty criminals 
in the area: 
They’re still here, the people who used to be involved with the crime [ie. 
traffickers]. They still live here. We know who they are. The police also know 
who they are. But it’s like this, those people have served their time and 
supposedly aren’t involved any more… There’s no way to prove it. So if they 




because they’re people that the rest of the young people respect… it helps 
to keep things ok, they help to improve things. For example, here we don’t 
have any kind of problem. Because one of those people is a person who lives 
in a house right here opposite, who was the manager of the old boca, he 
lives opposite us. So like, if anyone does anything against us, he’s the first 
to know, because he lives opposite. And so, who’s going to do anything? 
Because even if he’s not involved any more, he knows how to fight, right? 
[…] Because like, trouble on his doorstep is going to draw more attention to 
him. [Female, 38] 
This account suggests that police can benefit from the continued presence of respected 
traffickers who are able to deter petty criminality in a way that the police themselves cannot. 
This would not require direct collusion. The police could merely seek to preserve this state of 
affairs by not actively pursuing such figures. In this way, although seemingly locked in an 
conflictual relationship, police and traffickers may have found that in fact their best course of 
action was to cooperate in preserving a state of relative calm in the area. 
We are reminded here of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987: 11) discussion of the wasp and the 
orchid – two autonomous entities that incorporate one another into their respective 
reproductive processes. In Tuiuti’s emergent dual security assemblage, there is a becoming–
police of the bandido, and a becoming–bandido of the police. The bandido learns to play an 
auxiliary policing function and the police learn to acquiesce in certain forms of criminality. As 
the police became integrated within their new environment they embarked on a process of 
adaptation and learning, beginning to prioritise some objectives over others ad working out 
the most effective ways of achieving these. The result was that although the UPP programme 
had been intended to reduce trafficker influence in favelas, in Tuiuti it ended up becoming 
dependent on it.  
Hostages to both sides 
If Tuiuti’s dual security assemblage allows both police and traffickers to achieve their baseline 
objectives, residents were clearly divided as to the benefits. Several interviewees saw 
pacification either as overly aggressive or, on the other hand, like Marize, to be too weak to 




in particular highlighting that guns and drug-dealing were now far less visible and that they 
believed open conflict in the area to be less likely.  
However, even these residents did not regard the UPP as having brought meaningful public 
security to Tuiuti and many described the difficulties of living under pacification. In particular, 
many found that constant mutual surveillance between police and traffickers, which made 
their coexistence within a dual security assemblage possible, brought new challenges and 
stresses for residents in the their everyday circulations around the neighbourhood. When 
discussing her interactions with the police, Marize described how such surveillance played 
out: 
I respect them. I say hello, greet them, you understand… But we can’t have 
any interaction with them. We can’t because of the bandidos. If a bandido 
sees us having a conversation they’re going to think that we’re… we can’t. 
You can’t offer them a cup of water. You can’t offer… if you’re having a 
barbecue… give them a little plate, you can’t. Because they’ll see us there 
and think that we’re with the police. 
Long before the UPPs, Alvito (2001: 106-109) described the surveillance regime surrounding 
favela residents as ‘double panopticism’. While agents of the state would monitor favela 
residents in various ways outside the favela, traffickers would monitor them inside. Tuiuti 
after pacification could also be described as a regime of double panopticism, but one now 
playing out under claustrophobic spatial conditions. With police and traffickers both 
permanently present within the favela, residents must deal with the fact that both may be 
watching at the same time. In order to navigate such a context, residents must simultaneously 
maintain an awareness of the presence and behaviour of both police and traffickers in order 
to know what they can and can’t do at different times and places. However, they must also 
feign ignorance of possessing this knowledge. In the post-pacification context, residents must 
simultaneously see and not see both police and traffickers. They must see both, so as to know 
what it is they are supposed not to have seen (Penglase, 2009). 
This schizophrenic form of governmentality can take a heavy psychological toll and is further 




and the traffickers. While residents were obliged to accept the claims of both sides to being 
implacable enemies, even this could not be taken for granted. One resident explained: 
It’s got worse since the police entered, I think. That’s my opinion. Why? 
Because the police… It’s the police with the bandidos. Us citizens see them 
[the police] pass the bandidos and they can’t do anything, and that, for me, 
is why it’s got worse. […] The situation has left us hostages to both sides.8 
[…] It was bad, but not as bad as now. Because before the bandidos had an 
order, there was someone in charge… unfortunately. There was someone in 
charge and unfortunately you had to submit to the order of that person. 
Then it’s like the police arrive and you think that order will end, and you’ll 
be free, but it’s not like that. There’s the domain of the police, there’s the 
domain of the bandidos, and we don’t know who… […] We’re hostages to 
both sides. Because we know we can’t trust in the bandidos, clearly, but we 
also can’t trust the police. […] We don’t know if you speak to the police if 
they’re going to deliver you to the bandidos. We don’t trust them. We don’t 
have that trust. [Female, 40] 
Clearly then, some perceive Tuiuti’s dual security assemblage as having further undermined 
both their freedom and their security. While opinion varied regarding the relative merits of 
pacification, all respondents agreed it was not the kind of security they had hoped for. 
Conclusion: Rio de Janeiro’s insecurity machine 
The case of Tuiuti’s UPP offers important insights into how (in)security is assembled in urban 
space, particularly in marginalised spaces in Latin America. As outlined above, in such 
environments, the lack of a state monopoly on violence tends to produce hybrid formations 
that require the continual (re)negotiation of the terms of coexistence between state and non-
state actors. The example presented here supports the argument that policing programmes 
aimed at strengthening state control in such spaces cannot be understood based the 
assumption that the state is either monolithic or independent of what it seeks to govern. 
Rather, the way such programmes materialise is inevitably an emergent outcome of 
                                                      




interactions between diverse state and non-state actors, each driven by distinct objectives 
and evolving strategies for achieving these.  
For Tuiuti’s UPP, the primary objectives were to achieve a degree of territorial control, reduce 
violence and push drugs and arms trafficking underground, within the constraints of what 
budgetary and legal constraints would allow. Local traffickers, meanwhile, sought to continue 
profiting from the drugs trade and, as a means to this end, retain their influence over Tuiuti’s 
residents. Although very different and potentially at odds with one another, in practice these 
objectives proved to be relatively compatible, provided certain terms of coexistence could be 
established. This appears, ultimately, to have given rise to an implicit division of labour 
between police and traffickers, which at the same time blurred the boundaries between 
them. This dual security assemblage could not have be known in advance – it was the product 
of real subjects making decisions in response to conditions that were changing in real time. 
These actors entered into a process of negotiation and mutual becoming imposed upon them 
by their enforced spatial coexistence and the constraints to action that each faced. 
However, a larger question arises from this. ‘Assemblage’, as mobilised here, denotes not only 
the situated “coming together” of heterogeneous actors into new arrangements, it is also a 
way of thinking about what kinds of “coming together” are possible, of whether and how 
these can be sustained, and of what consequences they have for the different actors bound 
up in them. In Deleuzoguattarian terms, we must ask: what kind of machine could produce 
such an assemblage? What constraints and which “principles of inclusion and exclusion” 
(Buchanan, 2017) characterise it? This is clearly very different to asking which abstract or 
“underlying” logic can account for the form, and transformations, of the assemblage. The 
ontological imaginary at play is not one of determinations, but rather of degrees of freedom. 
Specific urban assemblages are not variations around a prototype produced by the same 
dominant/underlying process, but unique actualisations that emerge contingently within 
what virtual constraints may allow. 
This doesn’t mean that assemblage thinking cannot make use of explanatory tools that 
transcend the specific site and actors contained within it – a limitation that critics and even 
some advocates of assemblage thinking wrongly attribute to it. It simply means that it uses 




be sufficient causes. There are always relations of exteriority between the factors that shape 
a given assemblage, so that even in those rare cases when one factor appears to override all 
others, the possibility remains that autonomous forces capable of fundamentally altering the 
logic of the assemblage will emerge. So, for example, we should not ask how the UPP 
programme reflects the ideology, strategies and impacts of a “neoliberal” policing prototype. 
Instead, we ask what pressures and constraints the set of political priorities and governance 
technologies that we associate with neoliberalism place on those actors able to influence the 
resulting security assemblages. By the time such top-down infusions of energy have worked 
their way through different hierarchies, relationships and negotiation processes necessary for 
them to be actualised, the “neoliberal” elements may have become so diluted as to leave the 
concept with little explanatory power – even with the “actually existing” qualifier attached 
(Brenner and Theodore, 2002).  
Read in this way, any notion that an assemblage approach must imply a depoliticised or 
merely descriptive account of pacification couldn’t be further from the truth. Tuiuti’s dual 
security assemblage is clearly riven with tensions and inequalities “all the way down”. Even 
as local accommodations between police and traffickers preserved a degree of stability in the 
neighbourhood, these came at the cost of new forms of anxiety experienced by many 
residents. At the same time, they fit within, rather than challenging, the long-established 
terms of a broader political conversation that scapegoats favelas and their residents for urban 
insecurity and legitimates special measures for repressing them. Even if the way pacification 
actualised bore little resemblance to the best laid plans of the politicians and bureaucrats 
who designed it, it still reterritorialised within limits set by the larger machine. To paraphrase 
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